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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTEMPoRANEous DECLARATIONS OF INNO-
CENCE DO NOT NECESSARILY INVALIDATE GUILTY PLEAS-State of North Carolina
v. Henry C. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)-Alford was indicted for first degree
murder under a North Carolina statute that restricted the death penalty of jury con-
vicions. 1 Upon advice of his attorney and others, Alford pleaded guilty to second
degree murder but maintained his innocence. He was sentenced to 30 years im-
prisonment, the North Carolina statutory maximum.2 Following a series of appeal
actions, Alford's conviction was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit,3 which found Alford's plea to be coerced by a statutory penalty
scheme that was unconstitutional under United States v. Jackson.4 North Carolina
appealed, and the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in a six
to three decision.5 The Supreme Court held that guilty pleas representing "a vol-
untary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action" are valid."
Neither the existence of an unconstitutional penalty scheme nor defendant's inability
to admit his guilt invalidates his plea when the judge is satisfied that it has a factual
basis. 7
The Alford case raises two important questions concerning current guilty plea
standards. First, what is a coerced guilty plea? Second, what safeguards remain
in the guilt determining process to prevent disadvantaged but possibly innocent de-
fendants from convicting themselves when subjected to strong prosecutorial and
judicial pressures to plead guilty? The North Carolina statute under which Alford
was initially indicted contained the Jackson defect. Alford asserted and maintained
his innocence while entering the guilty plea recommended by his court-appointed
IThe pertinent North Carolina Statutes were: N.C. Gen. Star. § 14-17 (1969): Murder
in the first and second degree defined; punishment. A murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of 'willful,
deliberate and premediated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in
the first degree and shall be punished with death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict
in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in
the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder shaU be
deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than
two nor more than thirty years in the State's prison.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-162.1 (1965) (repealed 1969): Plea of guilty of first degree murder, first
degree burglary, arson or rape....
(b) In the event such plea is accepted, the tender and acceptance thereof shall have the effect of
a jury verdict of guilty of the crime charged with recommendation by the jury in open court that
th punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison; and thereupon, the court
shall pronounce judgment that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison....
2 See Transcript of Proceedings, North Carolina v. Alford, in the Superior Court, Forsyth
County, North Carolina (December 2, 1963 Term); Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 7-23,
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
4 390 U.S. 570 (1968): Three defendants were indicted under the Federal Kidnapping Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (see note 40 infra) for, inter alia, transporting across state lines a person they
had kidnapped, held for ransom and harmed before releasing. -On appeal from the district
court's dismissal of this count of the indictment, 262 F. Supp. 716-CD. Conn. 1967), the Su-
preme Court held that the Act's death penalty provision was invalid because it imposed an imper-
missible burden on the exercise of the fifth amendment right not to p!ad guilty and the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. This burden resulted from the fact that only the jury could
impose the death penalty. Therefore, guilty pleas were needlessly and impermissibly encouraged
in order to avoid the risk of a death sentence.
5 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
6ld. at 31.
7 Id. at 30, 36.
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attorney. Yet, without trial of these obvious factual and constitutional disputes be-
tween himself and the state, Alford was sentenced to prison.
To answer these questions, a mere reading of the Supreme Court's Alford de-
cision is not enough. In support of its holding, the Court suggested that the valid-
ity of Alford's plea could not be seriously questioned in view of the "overwhelming
evidence against him."8  The trial record, however, shows only circumstantial evi-
dence9 while Alford's attorney speaks of possible jury prejudice.'o The Jackson
decision, relied upon by the fourth circuit in reversing Alford's conviction, was se-
verely limited by the Supreme Court's subsequent Parker v. North Carolina" and
Brady v. United States12 decisions. Nevertheless, the requirement that the guilty
pleader admit committing the crime charged remained. With the addition of Al-
ford, the question of a guilty pleader's actual guilt seems to have been reduced to a
practical nullity. To understand these developments and the current state of the
law, a more detailed examination of Alford and its predecessors is necessary.
On December 2, 1964, Alford was brought to trial in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina for the murder of Nathaniel Young. Courtroom testimony was received
from the arresting officer, Alford and two state's witnesses. It tended to show that
Alford and Young had argued over whether Alford could make his white girl friend
leave Young's house. Apparently she wanted more money than Alford had to be
intimate with him. As a result of Young's intercession, Alford left without the girl
but took her coat which Young and another tried unsuccessfully to retrieve. A
short time later, Young answered a knock and was shot and killed through the par-
tially open door. At this point, the accounts of Alford and the state diverge. The
arresting officer testified as to his discussions with people who reported seeing Al-
ford the night of the murder. They included, among others, the black woman
Alford lived with and a man she had ejected from their house. According to the
officer, these people described Alford's argument with Young, saw Alford with his
shotgun, heard him threaten to kill Young and heard his subsequent confession.
Upon cross-examination, the officer acknowledged that Alford's gun was clean when
found, and that there was no ballistics evidence to associate it with the murder.
One of the two state's witnesses called by the defense testified that he heard Alford
say he had shot a man, but he was unable to corroborate the officer's story further.
The other witness reported seeing Afford with his gun but had not seen any shells
nor heard him threaten Young by name. Subsequently, Alford, testifying in his
own behalf, denied arguing with Young or returning to Young's house after leaving
with the woman's coat. No one saw who fired the shot. Before passing sentence,
the Court interviewed Alford and brought out his long criminal record which in-
cluded terms for murder, armed robbery, forgery and assault with a deadly weapon.' 3
Before trial, Alford's state-appointed attorney interviewed all of the state's wit-
nesses and all the witnesses suggested by Alford except one who could not be lo-
cated. 14 He discussed Alford's plea with him several times and advised that he
could not win against the state's evidence. He recommended that Alford plead
guilty to avoid the risk of a jury imposed death sentence. Alford's sister and others
81d. at 37.
9 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 2.
20 See discussion at note 16 infra.
"1397 U.S. 790 (1970).
12 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
'3 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 2.
14 Brief for Appellant at 10, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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who participated in the discussions agreed. 15 At Alford's post conviction hearing
in December 1964, Alford's attorney was asked if he had told ". . . the defendant
that things would go bad for him because the woman involved was a white
woman." The attorney recalled telling Afford:
... the facts were aggravated ... [and] I didn't think the jury would
look upon it favorably .... [T]he place that it had occurred .... wasn't
one of the most commendable places in the county .... [CJoncerning if
there was any prejudiced persons ... I could not tell who was prejudiced,
and that.., might affect him .... 16
At the trial, apparently fearing for his life, Alford pleaded guilty:
I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too
much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the other
man. We never had an argument in our life and I just pleaded guilty
because they said if I didn't they would gas me for it, and that is all.'7
Following sentencing, Alford pursued a series of post conviction actions, ap-
peals, and habeas corpus petitions charging inter alia, that his plea was coerced, that
his house was illegally searched and that he was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel.' 8 These reached a successful conclusion at the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in November, 1968.'- There, by a two to one decision, (Haynsworth, C. J.,
dissenting) 20 the court held that "... . the North Carolina statutory scheme was the
primary motivating force to affect tender of the plea, especially since throughout the
proceedings Alford had protested his innocence." 21 Based on its interpretation of
United States v. Jackson,22 this conclusion required that the judgment entered on
Alford's guilty plea could not stand 23 The court read Jackson to hold that:
... a prisoner is entitled to relief if he can demonstrate that his plea was
a product of [the impermissible] burdens [of a statutory penalty scheme
like that of North Carolina]-specifically, that his principle motivation
to plead guilty or to forego a trial by jury was to avoid the death pen-
alty.24
Although Alford had pleaded guilty to second degree murder, conviction of which
does not entail the death penalty,2z the court noted that "[flor all that appears in
the record, the state had not surrendered its right to prosecute petitioner for first
degree murder until the time when he agreed to plead guilty to second degree
murder."2 6 Haynsworth, dissenting, agreed with the majority's reading of Jackson
but held that the Jackson decision was irrelevant when defendant's plea was to a
non-capital offense.27 He apparently did not agree that the prosecutor at the Alford
trial had retained his right to charge Alford with first degree murder.
15 Brief for Appellee at 3-4, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
16 Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 3, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1T 400 U.S. at 28 n.2.
'
8 See Appendix, Counsels' Briefs at 1-4, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
19 Id. at 1-3.
20 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
21 1d. at 349.
22 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
23 405 F.2d at 349.
24 Id. at 347.
2 5 See note 1 supra.
26 405 F.2d at 347 n.17.
27 Id. at 350.
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North Carolina appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where the fourth
circuit was reversed on its faulty reading of Jackson.2g The Alford case was origi-
nally argued before the Court in the October term of 1969 but was not decided until
after reargument in 1970. In their initial briefs,29 counsels for both parties relied
primarily upon Jackson, differing only as to whether or not it should be applied
retroactively. Before reargument, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. North Caro-
lina30 and Brady v. United States,31 both of which sharply limited Jackson's appli-
cability. In their supplemental briefs, counsels for Alford and North Carolina con-
centrated on whether Afford's plea was voluntary or coerced.3 2
In its Alford decision, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a statutory pen-
alty scheme was unconstitutional under Jackson did not invalidate a guilty plea
simply because it was motivated by that scheme. The standard enunciated was that
the plea must represent ". . . a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alterna-
tive courses of action open to the defendant."' ' Having concluded that unconstitu-
tional motivation is not necessarily coercion, the Court still had the de novo problem
of Alford's declaration of innocence. Casting about for some precedent to show
the constitutionality of such an attenuated guilty plea, the Court hit on the device of
equating it with nolo contendere:
Implicit in the nolo contendere cases is a recognition that the Constitution
does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is un-
willing expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives,
is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence 3 4
Therefore, a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence also may be ac-
cepted and sentence passed if the judge finds that the plea was voluntarily and in-
telligently entered 3 5 By such semantic legerdemain, unwillingness to admit guilt
was made constitutionally equivalent to a declaration of innocence. The remaining
considerations for valid guilty pleas are the presence of counsel and the existence of
a strong state case to satisfy the judge that there is a factual basis for the plea as re-
quired by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.36 Almost incidentally, the Court
upheld the right of states to offer criminal defendants a lesser charge in return for
a guilty plea.37
How a guilty plea motivated by an unconstitutional penalty scheme can be valid
28The majority of the fourth circuit held that ". . . the incentive supplied to petitioner to
plead guilty by the North Carolina statutory scheme was the primary motivating force to effect
tender of the plea.... Under Jackson therefore, the judgment. . . cannot stand." 405 F.2d at
349. Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting, agreed: . - . [T]he victim of the very pressures Jackson
sought to avoid ought not to be left to suffer their consequences." 405 P.2d at 350. The Su-
preme Court disagreed with both: 'That he would not have pleaded (sic) except for the op-
portunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty
was not the product of a free and rational choice.... The standard fashioned and applied by
the Court of Appeals was therefore erroneous...." 400 U.S. at 31.
29 See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
30 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
31397 U.S. 742 (1970).
a2 See Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Supplemental Brief for Appellee, 400 U.S. 25
(1970).
33 400 U.S. at 31.
34 Id. at 36.
3 1d. at 38.
38 Id. at 31, 38 n.10; FED. P. CRIM. P. 11: . The Court shall not enter a judgment upon
a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea."
37 Id. at 39.
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is best understood by a review of the Jackson, Parker v. North Carolina38 and Brady
v. United States39 decisions. The Federal Kidnapping Act's penalty provisions, dealt
with in Jackson, provided that the death penalty could be assessed only by a jury.40
Therefore, only those who asserted the right to contest their guilt before a jury
risked the death penalty. In Jackson, the Court held that "[t]he inevitable effect
of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment
right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to de-
mand a jury trial."4 ' The chilling effect of such a penalty scheme is the "manner
[in which it] needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional rght.' '  The
Court noted that its ruling did not invalidate all penalty schemes in which a jury
has the power to recommend the death penalty, suggesting that those in which
".. . the choice between life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to the
jury in every case-regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been determined" 43
-would be legitimate. A statement in the decision little noted by subsequent com-
mentators44 served as the basis for the later Parker and Brady decisions:
... [T]he fact that the Federal Kidnapping Act tends to discourage de-
fendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury,
hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge
under the Act does so involuntarily.45
In Brady, the Court reviewed the conviction of a defendant who had pleaded
guilty under the Federal Kidnapping Act before the Jackson decision and who now
sought release on the basis that his plea was coerced. Referring to the little noticed
limitation that it had placed on the Jackson holding,46 the Court ruled that while
"Jackson prohibit[ed] the imposition of the death penalty under [the Federal Kid-
napping Act] . . ." it did not hold that ". . . all pleas of guilty encouraged by the
fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged
pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not."47  The standard for judging the va-
lidity of pleas reiterated by the Brady Court was that they ". are valid if both
'voluntary' and 'intelligent.' "48
Launching into a discussion of plea motivation, the Brady Court noted that
. t]he State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step
in the criminal process" 49 and that such pleas are generally valid unless produced by
threatened physical harm or mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.50
38 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
39 397 U.S. 742 (1970).40 The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), provides: Whoever knowingly trans-
ports in interstate... commerce, any person who has been unlawfully ... kidnapped ... and
held for ransom ... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liber-
ated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
4' 390 U.S. at 581.
421d. at 583.
431d. at 582.
44 See, e.g., Poe, Capital Punishment Statutes in the Wake of United States v. Jackson, 37
Gao. WASH. L. REV. 719 (1968-69); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAMW. L. REy. 63,
156 (1968-69).
45 390 U.S. at 583.
461d.






... [Blecause guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden [andl because
the criminal law characteristically extends to a judge or jury a range of
choice in setting the sentence in individual cases, . . . both the State and
the defendant often find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of the
maximum penalty authorized by law. For a defendant.., the advantages
of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty . . . [are that] his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and
the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State . . . [thel
advantages . . . [are] more promptly imposed punishment . . . and with
the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are con-
served. ....
•.. [I]t is [notl unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to
the defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State. .... .1
Finally, the Court noted that it "... would have serious doubts about [Brady's
guilty pleal if the.., offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that
defendants advised by competent counsel would falsely condemn themselves."' 52
... [Olur view [in this casel is to the contrary and is based on our ex-
pectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are vol-
untarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate
advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and
reliability of the defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes
with which they are charged. In the case before us, nothing in the record
impeaches Brady's plea or suggests that his admissions in open court were
anything but the truth ....
... [W]e have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt
was truthful.5 3
In coming to grips obliquely with the fact that Brady was convicted under a
statute containing an unconstitutional penalty provision, the Court noted that
" ... a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable
law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea
rested on a faulty premise."5 4  In another case decided the same day, McMann v.
Richardson,55 the Court expanded upon its denial of retroactivity to the Jackson rule
for pre-Jackson defendants. The Court noted that:
... [A] per se constitutional rule invalidating . . . guilty pleas . . . en-
tered prior to Jackson . .. would be an improvident invasion of the State's
interests in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions that were
valid under constitutional standards applicable at the time. It is no deni-
gration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant waives his
state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then
existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his
attorney's assessment of the law and facts. Although he might have
pleaded differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound
by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove serious dere-
lictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not,
after all, a knowing and intelligent act.56
511d. at 751-53.
52 Id. at 758.
53 Id.
r4 Id. at 757.
0, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
OId. at 774.
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Parker v. North Carolina57 case also decided the same day dealt with a de-
fendant's claim that his guilty plea to a charge of first degree burglary was invalid
as motivated by a capital punishment scheme since declared unconstitutional under
Jackson. The Court similarily rejected this appeal noting that while the statute un-
der which he was convicted contained an unconstitutional penalty provision, Parker's
"... . otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by [his] desire to limit
the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial."58
McMann and Parker were four to three decisions with one concurring opinion.
Justice Brennan, with Justices Douglas and Marshall, vigorously dissented to both
and later in the Alford case. The same three agreed with the Court's decision in
Brady on its facts but disagreed with its reasoning. In his separate opinions, Justice
Brennan accused the "Court [of] mov[ing] yet another step toward the goal of in-
sulating all guilty pleas from subsequent attack no matter what unconstitutional ac-
tion of government may have induced a particular plea." 59 The thrust of Brennan's
argument was that the majority had misconstrued its own holding in Jackson.
Apparently in the Court's view, we invalidated the death penalty in Jack-
son because it "encouraged" pleas that are perfectly valid despite the en-
couragement. Rarely, if ever, have we overturned an Act of Congress
for what proves to be so frivolous a reason. . . . [T]he result [is that]
- . . those who resisted the pressures identified in Jackson and after a jury
trial were sentenced to death receive relief, but those who succumbed to
the same pressures and were induced to surrender their constitutional
rights are left without any remedy at all. Where the penalty scheme
failed to produce its unconstitutional effect, the intended victims obtain re-
lief; where it succeeded, the real victims have none.60
Concerning the majority's finding ". . . that 'there [is no] evidence that
Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did
not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going
to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty,' "61 Justice Brennan comments
that ".... it has never been thought that an individual's mental state must border on
temporary insanity before his confession or guilty plea can be found 'involun-
tary.' "62
Justice Brennan then attacked the types of criminal justice system pressures that
induce an innocent man to plead guilty, especially those of legislative origin.63
We are dealing here, with the legislative imposition of a markedly more
severe penalty if a defendant asserts his right to a jury trial and a con-
comitant legislative promise of leniency if he pleads guilty. This is very
different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining
between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively
equal bargaining power. No such flexibility is built into the capital pen-
alty scheme where the government's harsh terms with respect to punish-
57 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
58 Id. at 795.
59 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,775 (1970).
60 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,807-08 (1970).
61 Id. at 800 n.2.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 158 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S
847 (1968): "Plea bargaining that induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot be san-




ment are stated in unalterable form .... Thus [a] penalty scheme [that
is unconstitutional under Jackson] .. .presents a clear danger that the
innocent, or those not dearly guilty, or those who insist upon their inno-
cence, will be induced nevertheless to plead guilty.64
Justice Brennan also notes that "[iut has frequently been held.., that a guilty plea
induced by threats or promises by the trial judge is invalid because of the risk that
the trial judge's impartiality will be compromised and because of the inherently un-
equal bargaining power of the judge and the accused." '6 5 In his brief dissent to Al-
ford, Justice Brennan, in effect, confirms that the fears he expressed in his other
opinions had now been constitutionalized by the Supreme Court:
Today the Court makes dear that its previous holding was intended to
apply even when the record demonstrates that the actual effect of the un-
constitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea from a defendant who was
unwilling to admit his guilt.66
Thus, the Alford decision has greatly narrowed the grounds for attacking a
guilty plea as being coerced. Jackson had seemed to hold out the promise that no
unnecessary state encouragement of guilty pleas was permissible. Though that case
specifically proscribed only statutes which limited the death penalty to not guilty
pleaders, any judicial or legislative scheme offering lesser penalties for guilty pleas
appeared to have the same constitutional defect.67 But then the McMann, Parker,
Brady trio dispelled that misconception by pointing out that only the statutes were
unconstitutional, not the guilty plea convictions generated by them. The remaining
Brady limitation, that the defendant reasonably believe himself guilty, was removed
by Alford. The rule now seems to be that as long as the defendant retains any
power of decision, as long as his will is not overborne by mental coercion, as indi-
cated by the presence of uncomplaining counsel, his guilty plea will stand up. The
Alford Court adds that the plea must have a factual basis, but that apparently means
little more than a strong enough state case to secure an indictment.
Before attempting to determine what safeguards remain to protect the innocent
from pleading guilty under pressure, it is necessary to review some of the kinds of
pressures to which they are exposed. Since the previously cited cases deal primarily
with the influence of sentences on pleas, the following discussion will be limited to
that consideration and the part the prosecutor, judge and defense counsel play in it.
The Alford Court traced the practice of judicial sentence bargaining back to
early English cases in which defendants unsure of their trial prospects sought to
mitigate their punishment by a nolo contendere plea. The defendant thereby con-
sented that he be punished and prayed for leniency but did not expressly admit his
guilt.68 The Court also found no constitutional distinction between nolo pleas and
Alford's guilty plea.
The fact that [Alford's] plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather
than a plea of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance . . .
for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the
formal categorizations of state law.69
64 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,809 (1970).
651d. at 804.
66 400 U.S. at 40.
67 See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 44, at 161.
68 400 U.S. at 35 n.8.
Cl 400 U.S. at 37. See also discussion and cases cited 400 U.S. at 35-36 and n.8.
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But, it is clear that the nolo plea often has a different practical effect than a guilty
plea and therefore a different motivation. A defendant concerned with subsequent
tort liability arising out of his alleged criminal acts does not make his civil plaintiff's
proof by a nolo plea as he would by a guilty plea. It is easy to see why a criminally
guilty defendant might wish to minimize his civil risks by a nolo plea. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to visualize pressures external to the criminal justice system
that would induce him to plead guilty while protesting his innocence.
The state and lower federal courts have differed as to whether a guilty plea ac-
companied by protestations of innocence can be accepted. Some hold that the law
authorizes a conviction only where guilt is shown.70 Others have concluded that
they should not force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case particularly
where the advancement of that defense might end in disaster. He must be per-
mitted to judge for himself in this respect.71 In spite of its facile equating of nolo
and guilty pleas, the Supreme Court too had experienced difficulty with the question
before Alford. In 1962, in Lynch v. Overholser, the Court inferred that there would
have been no constitutional error had a trial court accepted a defendant's guilty plea
even though evidence before that court indicated that the defendant had a valid de-
fense.72 Two years later, in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court ruled that ". . . state and
federal [courts] are... constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence in-
dependently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an
accused out of his own mouth."73 But the Alford decision settled the matter.
... [A]n express admission of guilt ... is not a constitutional requisite
to the imposition of a criminal penalty. An individual accused of a crime
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his par-
ticipation in the acts constituting the crime.74
The Fourth Circuit, whose decision in Alford was reversed by the Supreme
Court, obviously got caught up in the same problem. In 1968, it held that: "Plea
bargaining that induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot be sanctioned.""7
The next year the same court said:
70 See, e.g., Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex
rel. Elkins v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 255-157 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); People v. Morrison, 348
Mich. 88, 81 N.W.2d 667 (1957); State v. Reali, 26 N.J. 222, 139 A.2d 300 (1958); State v.
Leyba, 80 N.M. 190, 193, 453 P.2d 211, 214 (1969); Harris v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 126, 131,
172 S.W. 975, 977 (1915); State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 361-64, 261 P.2d 400, 402-03
(1953).
71 See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bruce v. United States,
379 F.2d 113, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McCoy v. United States, 363 P.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir.
1966): ".... guilt or the degree of guilt, is at times uncertain or elusive.... An accused, though
believing in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury
would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty.
... "; City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum);
State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 138, 403 P.2d 597, 602-03 (1965); People v. Hetherington, 379
Ill. 71, 39 N.E.2d 361 (1942); State ex rel Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 307-08, 116
N.W.2d 666, 671-72 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969).
Cf. United States ex rel Brown v. La Vallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970); Maxwell v. United
States, 368 F.2d 735, 739 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966) (trial judge may either accept or reject an other-
wise valid guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence).
72 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962), referred to in 400 U.S. at 35.
73 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
74 400 U.S. at 37.
7 5 Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 158 n.7. (4th Cir. 1968).
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We think that plea bargaining serves a useful purpose both for society and
the prisoner and is a permanent part of the criminal courtroom scene....
Here it seems rather obvious that in return for pleading guilty to one
count permitting the court ample latitude for adequate punishment .. .
the prosecutor agreed, quite properly we think, to dismiss the other
Count.76
It is dear that plea or sentence bargaining is responsible for most of the guilty
pleas entered in state criminal courts. Studies in Massachusetts7 7 show that at the
indictment stage 13.2% of the defendants entered guilty pleas. By trial, however,
67.8% pleaded guilty, and over 93.2% of the pleas were to lesser charges than
those for which the defendants were indicted.7 8 Studies in Cook County Illinois
(Chicago) show that 84% of all felony cases were disposed of without trial and
suggest that between 70 and 80% of the criminal court's guilty pleas were nego-
tiated.70 The variation in percent of convictions by guilty plea from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction is fairly wide. It ranges from 95.5% in New York County through
85.2% in Massachusetts to 66.8% in Pennsylvania. The average for trial courts of
general jurisdiction in states where the information is available is 87%. 8° The per-
centage of guilty or nolo contendere pleas in federal district court criminal actions
is lower (75%) but still impressive. 81 The importance of guilty pleas to the Amer-
ican criminal justice system is obvious. Chief Justice Burger said last August that
a reduction in guilty pleas from 90% to 80% would require doubling the present
number of judges, lawyers and courtrooms. 82
Since a guilty plea, unless rejected which rarely occurs, leads inevitably to sen-
tence without trial, a process that increases guilty pleas must exert some kind of
pressure on criminal defendants. In Brady the Supreme Court viewed lighter sen-
tences by the state as the constitutional quid pro quo for the guilty plea of a defend-
ant who sees slight possibility of acquittal. Such pleas conserve the state's judicial
and prosecutorial resources for other cases ".... in which there is substantial doubt
that the State can sustain its burden of proof."' 3 So viewed, plea bargaining pres-
sures are used only in circumstances where they produce the same result as a trial
but with substantial savings to the state. A University of Pennsylvania Law School
survey of 43 states suggests that such a view is unrealistic. It showed that most
prosecutors who utilized negotiated pleas stated that they prepared indictments
with plea bargaining in mind and that the factor that most often influenced them
to negotiate for a guilty plea was the weakness of their case.84 If one assumes
that the weaker the state's case the more likely that the defendant is innocent, the
conclusion that the coercive pressures of plea bargaining are used most often on the
innocent is inescapable. The United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama
eloquently expostulated the plight of the defendant subjected to these pressures.
76 United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940,948-49 (4th Cir. 1969).
77 Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in Massachusetts, 3 SUF-
FOLK U.L Rnv. 292 (1968-69).
78 Id. at 306.
7 0 Notes and Comments, The Role of Plea Negotiation in Modern Criminal Law, 46 CM.-
KENT L REv. 116 (1969).80 Carney & Fuller, supra note 77.
81 Fay, "Bargained For" Guilty Pleas, 4 CRM. L BUL. 265 (1968).
82 Oelsner, The Court Upholds the Right to Bargain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, § 4, at 12,
col. 3.
83 397 U.S. at 752.
84 Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112
U. PA. L. Rnv. 865, 901, 905 (1964).
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Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he
may be put on trial without a proper charge and convicted upon incom-
petent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmis-
sible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intel-
ligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect.8 5
Against these pressures, the judicial system has sought to erect safeguards.
Powell extols the importance of the guiding hand of counsel at every step, and Al-
ford makes its dear that competent counsel is an important element in determining
the voluntariness of a defendant's plea.86 Since Gideon v. Wainwright, it is im-
possible to force a criminal defendant to trial without aid of counsel,87 but the mere
presence of counsel does not insure that a defendant will intelligently understand
and exercise his options. Counsel must be effective. Several factors suggest that
the level of effectiveness required to protect defendants from pressures to plead
guilty are far above the mere constitutional standards. First, one is faced by the fact
that many defendants are represented by court appointed counsel who, while ethi-
cally bound to their clients, are not economically bound. Second, the D.C. Circuit
has announced that counsel is not ineffective in the constitutional sense unless his
assistance is ". . . of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the court and make
the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice."'s And in McMann, the Supreme
Court noted that there is ". . . inherent uncertainty in guilty-plea advice [which does
not make it] . . . an issue promising a meaningful and productive evidentiary hear-
ing long after entry of the guilty plea." (emphasis added).89
It is interesting to speculate on the soundness of his counsel's advice to Alford.
The evidence, as Alford himself noted in his plea, was all circumstantial.90 None
of the witnesses at the trial heard Alford threaten the victim by name or confess to
his murder. None of them saw him outside his house with the shotgun. But the
arresting officer's report of the statement of other witnesses not present at trial was
not contradicted. The state admitted having no evidence that Alford's gun was the
murder weapon or that it had been fired. The trial judge did not attempt to find
85 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
86400 U.S. at 31. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970); Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 804 (1970) (dissenting opinion): ".... [T]he presence of coun-
sel is a factor to be taken into account in any overall evaluation of the voluntariness of a...
guilty plea." (Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, J.J., dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 466 (1966) : "[Counsel's) presence would insure that statements made in the government-
established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion."
87 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963): "... [Pjrocedural and substantive safeguards designed to as-
sure fair trials.. . cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his ac-
cusers without a lawyer to assist him.88 Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436,440 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
89 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970).
90 400 U.S. at 28 n.2: "Well, I'm still pleading that you all got me to plead guilty. I plead
the other way, circumstantial evidence ... You told me to plead guilty, right. I don't-I'm
not guilty but I plead guilty."
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out from Afford if he was guilty but did review in detail his previous criminal rec-
ord.91 Alford's counsel recalled advising Alford that he did not believe the jury
would look favorably upon Alford's case because of the place where Alford had
been and the possible prejudices of jurors.9 2 Ignoring regional differences, the case
against Afford was certainly not air-tight.93
The lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have both noted that the judge
should not participate in the plea bargaining process. When a defendant receives
an offer from a judge he "... . needs no reminder that if he rejects the proposal and
stands upon his right to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly longer sen-
tence." 9 4 In discussing the various valid pressures on a defendant to plead guilty,
the Brady Court excludes ". .. the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both,
deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular de-
fendant to tender a plea of guilty."9 5 The ABA in its Standards Relating to Pleas
of Guilty states that the judge must not participate in plea discussions.96 Judicial
acceptance of plea bargaining assumes that the presence of a fair and impartial judge
will insure against abuse.97 How valid is that assumption?
In the late 1950s the Yale Law Journal sent a questionnaire to 240 federal dis-
trict judges, 140 of whom returned answers.98  Ninety three, or 66%, of these in-
dicated that it was accepted practice to take guilty pleas into consideration in sen-
tencing. The average sentence reduction accorded those who pleaded guilty was in
excess of 40%.99 Thirty four of those questioned conceded that guilty pleas saved
the government a great deal of time and money.100 While a judge may not par-
ticipate in plea bargaining, it is highly unlikely that his favorable treatment of guilty
pleaders is a very well kept secret.
For many defendants, then, the counterbalances envisioned by the Supreme
Court as protections against abuse of plea bargaining seem illusory indeed. For a
defendant represented by court appointed counsel, an effective attack on inadequate
representation is almost impossible. Prosecutors, instead of using plea bargaining
to lighten the defendant's burden when he is faced with an air-tight case, use it to
lighten their own burdens when their case is weak. Judges implement the prose-
cutors efforts by regularly extending concessions to guilty pleaders, cutting sentences
on the average by nearly half. Couple these hazards with the fact that in federal
courts the indictment to sentence delay in jury trials is two and one half times that
91 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 2.
92 Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 3.
9 3 But see 400 U.S. at 37: "... [H~e had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial ... [b]ecause
of the overwhelming evidence against him .. "
94 United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
95 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 (1970).
96 Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.3, at 11, 71-72.
07 See 400 U.S. at 38 & n.10; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); PREsiDENT's
CoMI ussIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIE 136 (1967): "The judge's role is not that of one of the parties
to the negotiation, but that of an independent examiner to verify that the defendant's plea is the
result of an intelligent and knowing choice and not based on misapprehension or the product of
coercion."
08 Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YALE LJ. 204 (1956-57).
00 Id. at 207 n.19.
100Id. at 219.
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for guilty pleas,'O' and it becomes fairly obvious that the state has structured the
plea bargaining system to force defendants to plead guilty as the lesser of two
evils.102
But, in spite of its practical faults, a negotiated plea system may be inherently
fair. Its benefits were listed by the Supreme Court in Brady. The defendant limits
his penalty exposure. The correctional process can begin immediately. The prac-
tical burdens of a trial are eliminated. Punishment begun promptly after the ad-
mission of guilt may be more effective. The state conserves scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources.'0 3 The disadvantages, on the other hand, are substantial.
For the procedural and evidentiary standards and safeguards of the trial process, are
substituted the generally standardless process of administrative guilt determination.
Most prosecutors who participate have no formal rules or procedures with respect to
plea bargaining.' 04 Therefore, the generally prevalent practices of overcharging and
negotiating in the face of weak cases are engaged in on an ad hoc basis. Since, as
a rule, there is no acknowledgement by the prosecutor or defendant that an arrange-
ment has been reached, it is impossible for the judge or public to be aware of the
terms of the bargain, the pressures that may have been brought to bear or the pro-
priety of these arrangements.' 0 5
Inherent in the guilty plea itself and independent of pleading pressures is a
waiver of important constitutional trial rights. These include the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment rights to trial by jury
and confrontation of one's accusers. Such waivers have been legalized by the Su-
preme Court but only when they are knowingly and intelligently made.100
The Alford Court suggested that the judge could test the quality of Alford's
plea by the weight of the evidence against him, assuming apparently that the guilty
plea must be voluntary if the evidence is strong.1'O But by what standards
is that evidence to be evaluated? The defendant is not required to put on a de-
fense; therefore the effectiveness of his counsel's preparation cannot be evaluated,
The exclusionary rules which control the evidence collecting and presenting prac-
tices of law enforcement agencies are effective only at the trial and do not come
under scrutiny after a guilty plea. Jerome Skolnick is concerned that guilty pleas
may serve to shield from public view a "patterned occurence of violations of crim-
inal law by police"'' S in such areas as search and seizure, eavesdropping and con-
fession. At best it appears that the standard for guilt confirmation after a guilty
plea has become "more likely than not" guilty rather than guilty "beyond a reason-
101 A'NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 269 (1968).
102 Griffiths, Ideology and Criminal Process for a Third Model of the Criminal Process, 79
Y'ALE LJ. 359, 398 (1970).
103 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
104 Note. Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 84 at 900. 70.2% of the prosecuting officers
who engaged in plea bargaining reported that their office had not established any formal rules or
procedures with respect to plea bargaining.
105 Carney and Fuller, supra note 77, at 294.
106 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583-84 (1968); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 370 (1951); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926); Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
107 400 U.S. at 38-39; "In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the
State ... we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it...
The prohibitions against involuntary and unintelligent pleas should not be relaxed .... "




able doubt." The Alford Court, for instance, holds that in view of the strong fac-
tual basis for Alford's plea, the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in
accepting it but also noted in favorably quoting Lynch v. Overholser0 9 that there
would have been no constitutional error even though the evidence before the judge
indicated that there was a valid defense.
Regardless of the faults of a plea bargaining system, guilty pleas promote judi-
cial economy. The criminal courts, aided by the lesser proof standards, the absence
of procedural controls and defendant's dearth of appeal bases" 0 have a powerful
tool for the conservation of their resources. The function of these resources is the
protection of the public by screening out and dealing with the guilty through ap-
propriate sentences. It is obvious that to the extent that plea bargaining ensnares
the innocent, it prostitutes the resources it conserves. But what about the sentences
themselves? Strict justice would seem to require that a defendant's sentence be
determined by his particular character and the nature of the crime he committed,
with no penalty for innocence." I  Plea bargaining, on the other hand, is fueled by
the availability of disparate sentences for the same crime and defendant. This dis-
crepancy is most obvious when one considers that the offer of zero penalty for guilty
pleas would reduce the state's trial burden to zero. Such a result would put the
criminal on the same footing with the non-criminal, except for the slight inconven-
ience of the bargaining process. The victory of expediency over integrity would be
complete.
For a defendant to benefit from a bargained sentence he must understand the
factors involved. He is required to intelligently determine the value of the ratio
5 GP whrsetneas-
SGx, , where SGP is the sentence awarded for a guilty plea, So is the sen
tence assessed after conviction at trial and Po is the probability of conviction at trial.
An intelligent, knowledgeable defendant will plead guilty when this ratio is less
than one. Since the probability of conviction is always less than one, the ratio can
never be one or more unless So is greater than SG,. As suggested above, there are
a number of factors at work in plea bargaining that can produce this result. Among
them are:
1. the higher penalty available due to the fact that prosecutors over-
charge for plea bargaining purposes."12
2. the charge reduction offered by the prosecutor for a guilty plea."13
3. the existence of a Jackson-type penalty scheme.
100 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962); see discussion at note 77 supra.
110 See discussion at note 86 supra; and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970):
"The rule that a plea must be intelligently made... does not require that a plea be vulnerable to
later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his deci-
sion."
ll See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) at 10-11: "This
section reflects a number of the most important conclusions embodied in the draft. It is prem-
ised on the view that the length and nature of the sentences of imprisonment authorized by the
Code must rest in part upon the seriousness of the crime and not as has been argued, solely on
the character of the offender;" and PREsEDENT's CoMMIssIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMImsTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGER OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 144 (1967):
"A judge when he sentences needs facts about the offender and his offense."
112 Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 84, 905 (Over half the prosecutors who uti-
lized the negotiated plea stated that they prepared indictments with plea bargaining in mind.).
"13 Id.
19711
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4. the effect on the sentencer of the prosecutor's comments on the de-
fendant's failure to plead guilty."14
5. the bonus given by the sentencing judge for a guilty plea."15
By throwing its weight behind plea bargaining, which for its utility requires that
the value of the ratio be equal to or greater than one, the Supreme Court has ac-
corded these factors (with the exception of the Jackson-type penalty scheme) at
least implicit constitutional sanction. For the criminal defendant, guilty or inno-
cent, the Court's Alford decision can have only two consequences: greater pressure
to plead guilty and longer sentences for not-guilty pleaders.
It is now possible to suggest an answer to the second question propounded at
the outset: What safeguards remain in the guilt determining process? The rights of
criminal defendants have suffered a significant set-back. After laboriously develop-
ing safeguards for the accused in his unequal contest with the state, the Supreme
Court has abruptly reversed its ground. As a result, criminal defendants trapped
into pleading guilty by unconstitutional penalty provisions still extant," 0 by prose-
cutorial and judicial plea bargaining pressures and by just plain bad advice have
convicted themselves. They need not believe they are guilty. It is enough that they
"voluntarily and intelligently" repeat the ritual words that confer sentence without
trial. The court need not prove nor believe they are guilty. A factual basis for the
plea suffices. That standard implies that anyone who is indicted may be convicted
upon a guilty plea. While perhaps inescapable where an unpressured defendant
enters a guilty plea, such a standard is a prostitution of justice when applied to one
who steadfastly maintains his innocence. It is in no sense equivalent to the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard previously required when a criminal defendant's
innocence was in dispute. With the need to purge a man of his delusions of inno-
cence before accepting his guilty plea eliminated, the percentage of guilty plea con-
victions will undoubtedly rise well above the present average of 87%.
Walker B. Lowman
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-REQUIREMENT FOR A SECURITY AGREE-
MENT UNDER SECTION 9-203 (1) (b)-In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va.
1970)-Prior to 1966, Security National Bank of Roanoke (Bank) extended credit
to Mann, a merchant of pianos, organs and other musical equipment. On January
5, 1966, five days after the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in Virginia,'
Bank filed a duly executed financing statement which included the title "Financing
Statement," the names and addresses of Bank and its debtor, and otherwise com-
114 Note, The Influenre of the Defendant's Plea, supra note 98, at 207 n.20 (Thirty judges
affirmed that it was the practice of the District Attorney at the pre-sentence hearing to stress the
fact that the convicted person pleaded not guilty and was found guilty by a jury.).
115 Id. at 221-22: "Judges have indicated that a defendant pleading not guilty may incur
additional punishment because he... does not contribute to the efficient administration of jus-
tice."
116 Including as of May 15, 1969: 18 U.S.C. 1111 (1964) (murder); 21 U.S.C. 176 (b)
(1964) (sale of narcotics to minors); 42 U.S.C. 2274-76 (1964) (atomic secrets); 18 U.S.C. 2113
(e) (1964) (bank robbery); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2801 (1967) (rape); La. Code Crim. Pro. art.
557 (1966); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 585; 4, 5 (1968); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1,14 (1966);
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-59 (1957).
iJanuary 1,1966. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.10-101 (Added Vol. 2A 1965).
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plied with U.C.C. § 9-402.2 The word "collateral" appeared in the statement no
less than four times; the property purportedly secured was described as follows:
Inventory of new pianos, organs, including hi-fidelity equipment and
stereo tape recorders, as well as all other miscellaneous inventory including
but not limited to the above items together with all documents of title
representing such collateral as well as accounts receivable and contract
rights now in existence or hereafter arising or acquired. 3
Subsequent to the filing of this statement, Mann executed nine trust receipts in favor
of Bank, each of which listed as collateral particular items by make, model and se-
rial number. One of these receipts indicated that it was a renewal of a previous
note.
On December 2, 1966, Mann executed a security agreement with the Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA), "whereby he granted to the latter a security interest in
accounts receivable and inventory." 4  The SBA filed its financing statement on Jan-
uary 12, 1967.5
During Mann's subsequent bankruptcy proceedings the SBA conceded the en-
forceability of Bank's security interest in those items specifically listed in the trust
receipts but asserted that by reason of the absence of a signed security agreement,6
Bank's claimed interest in accounts receivable and general inventory was unenforce-
able. Bank maintained that its financing statement had been intended by the parties
to be a security agreement and that it met the Code's requirements as such.7 The
referee, reading the financing statement and the trust receipts together as a security
agreement, held that Bank had an enforceable security interest in the inventory and
accounts. The SBA petitioned to review the referee's order.
The district court agreed that Bank had an enforceable security interest in those
items identified in the trust receipts, but reversed, holding that the financing state-
ment could not substitute for a signed security agreement. After first noting that
priority of interests in the same collateraal is determined by order of filing,8 the
court compared perfection of a security interest by the filing of a financing state-
ment9 with enforceability under the Article 9 statute of frauds.10 Observing that a
security agreement is effective according to its terms," the court held the trust re-
ceipts to have created enforceable security interests but also that the financing state-
ment could not expand such interests beyond the items described in those receipts.12
The court observed correctly that its decision was within the weight of prevailing
judicial authority and relied primarily on Mid-Eastern Electronics, Inc., v. First Na-
tional Bank of Southern Maryland'3 as foreclosing Bank's reliance on the financing
2 UNiFORMf COMiMERCIA CODE (1962 official text) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] Local en-
actments will be cited to the official sections, with changes material to the discussion noted.
The Virginia U.C.C. is found in VA. CODE ANN. (Added Vol. 2A 1965).
3 In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 33 (W.D. Va. 1970).
4Id. at 34.
G In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 34 (W.D. Va. 1970).
OU.CC § 9-203(1)(b).
71d.
8 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
9 U.C.C. § 9-402.
'oU.C.C. § 9-203.
"1U.C.C. § 9-201.
1 2 In re. Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 36 (W.D. Va. 1970).
13 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967).
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statement. The Mid-Eastern court had denied enforceability of a security interest
daimed on promissory notes and a filed financing statement with the words:
As the [creditorl can proffer no writing signed by the debtor giving, even
sketchily, the terms of the security agreement it is unenforceable. 14
The Mann court's opinion concludes with the observation that, inasmuch as the
SBA had constructive notice of Bank's claimed security interest, 15 the decision might
seem unduly harsh, but that it was demanded by the necessary technicalities of the
Code, Bank simply having used a form inappropriate to its purposes.' 6
The Code provides that a non-possessory "security interest is not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties ... unless the debtor has signed a security agreement
which contains a description of the collateral . . . .""1 "Security agreement" is de-
fined as "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest,"' 8 and
" '[algreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances .... "19 Certainly, this language of it-
self does not require the creditor to produce a writing containing every facet of the
parties' bargain over the debtor's signature. For example, in keeping with an un-
derlying purpose to simplify the law of commercial transactions 20 and an attempt to
reduce formal requirements to a minimum21 "any description" of the collateral
which reasonably identifies what is described suffices.22 The only requirements for
enforceability dictated by the Code, then, are the debtor's signature, a description of
the collateral and a writing.22 The financing statement filed by Bank in In re Mann
was all this, and more. Why should the financing statement not legally satisfy the
requirement for a signed security agreement? The Code does not say specifically
that it may not, and clearly does provide that the security agreement may be filed
as a financing statement.2 4 However logical a reading of the Code, this initial con-
dusion is not current law. To date, the courts hold that mere evidence of indebted-
14Mid-Pastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Nael Bank of Southern Maryland, 380 F.2d 355,
356 ( 4th Cir. 1967).
15 There is no claim by SBA that it was mislead as to the collateral secured, nor does it appear
that an exhaustive examination of Mann's credit was made prior to granting the loan. Brief
for Security Nat'l Bank at 5, 8, In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970); Brief for S.B.A.
at 4, In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970).
16 In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 36 (W.D. Va. 1970).
17 U.CC. §9-203(1)(b).
18U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h).
19 U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
2 6U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
2 1 U.CC. § 9-203 Comment 1.
22U.C.C. § 9-110. It is worthy of some note that this section is absent from the court's
opinion in In re Mann. While the specificity of the descriptions in the trust receipts may have
had probative weight to the trier of fact, the description contained in the financing statement
was legally sufficient. See generally United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013
(D.N.H. 1966); Security Tire and Rubber Co. v. Hass, 246 Ark. 1084, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969).
Mann is not a decision based upon adequacy of description.
23 See U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 1.
2 4 U.C.C. § 9-402(1). Because the security agreement must describe "the collateral," and the
financing statement need only "indicate the types" of collateral, the statement's description may
not suffice for the agreement, with the unfortunate result that the unwary creditor can end up
with a security interest attached and perfected but nonetheless unenforceable. While Professor
Gilmore has observed that "[tjhere is no excuse for the failure of the two sections to mesh with
respect to the description requirement," 1 G. GILMoltE, SEcURITy INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 11.4 at 347 (1965), the pitfall still exists.
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ness and a financing statement, taken together, do not create or provide for an en-
forceable non-possessory security interest.23
In considering whether a financing statement satisfies the Code's requirements
for a signed security agreement, three questions will underlie the discussion: What
is the nature and content of the security agreement required by the Code? What
objectives are served by the requirement? Does or should a financing statement fail
to meet security agreement criteria as a matter of law? The discussion will conclude
that the requirement for a signed security agreement can and should be permitted to
vary somewhat with local law and the facts of each case, and further, that judicial
language which establishes rigid requirements may frustrate the objectives of the
Code and the flexibility of the courts.26
Initially, it should be noted that a signed security agreement is not required to
create, attach or perfect a non-possessory security interest, but only to enforce one.2 7
The separate requirement for a signed writing contained in § 9-203(1) (b) can be
viewed as nothing more than a technicality grounded in the ancient history of the
statute of frauds. However, examination of the drafters' Comment 1 to the section
suggests that technicalities were precisely what they sought to avoid:
Here as elsewhere in this Article . . . formal requisites are reduced to a
minimum. The technical requirements of acknowledgment, accompanying
affidavits, etc., common to much chattel mortgage legislation, are aban-
doned. The only requirements for the enforceability of non-possessory
security interests in cases not involving land are (a) a writing; (b) the
debtor's signature; and (c) a description of the collateral .... 28
Viewed from the confines of this Comment alone, Bank's financing statement in
Mann was more than adequate; it was a writing over the debtor's signature which
contained a description of the collateral. 29 Yet it was held inadequate as a signed
security agreement; something more was required. The "something more" has been
explored by the courts but has as yet escaped precise judicial definition.
A leading case30 holding a financing statement inadequate to enforce a claimed
security interest was American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co.,31 in which the court stated:
2aSee, e.g., Safe Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968);
Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1967); Mid-Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Southern Maryland, 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Burkhard, 6 U.C.C. REP. Smtv.
244 (Bkrptcy. Ct, S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1129 (Bkrptcy. Cr., D.
Me. 1969); M. Rutkin Elec. Supply Co. v. Burdette Elec., Inc., 98 N.J. Super. 378, 237 A.2d
500 (1967); American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
26 Two minor preliminary points are warranted: First, while the Mann court stated the issue
as one of priority and purported to limit its derision to the relative priorities of the two credi-
tors, In re lann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 33, 36 (W.D. Va. 1970), this language should be disre-
garded. While any discussion of preferred creditors involves priority in a larger sense, this is
not the "priority" of the Code. Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to 9-318 with §§ 9-201 to 9-208. The
Mann decision turns on enforceability and not on priority, as the decision itself implicitly rec-
ognizes. Bank's security interest was either enforceable or it was not. Second, this discussion
makes no attempt to question any courts' decision that an enforceable security interest was not
created in fact. Rather, the point of focus is the ways in which such a factual conclusion has
and should be stated in law.
27 U.C.C. § 9-204(1) provides in pat: "A security interest cannot attach until there is agree-
ment (subsection (3) of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights
in the collateral." See 1 G. GILiORB, SEcuRITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.5 at
353 (1965).2 8U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 1.
29 See note 3 infra.
30 And the first construction of the Code by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
3197 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
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[Wjhile it is possible for a financing statement and a security agreement
to be one and the same document ... it is not possible for a financing
statement which does not contain the debtor's grant of a security interest
to serve as a security agreement.3 2
Citing American Card, other courts have held that the requirements of § 9-203(1)
(b) are satisfied if, in addition to that section's stated requisites, the writing also
contains language granting the creditor a security interest in the collateral.33 Such
granting language is not explicitly demanded by the Code. Moreover, to the extent
that § 9-203(1) (b) is the Article 9 statute of frauds, a requirement for a granting
clause might be inconsistent with prior law in those jurisdictions where a statement
of consideration is not a requisite of enforceability.3 4
Prestigious academic authority has taken issue with American Card. Professor
Gilmore has labeled it an "unfortunate decision," asserting that a granting clause is
not required by § 9-203 and suggesting that the financing statement at issue satisfied
the statute of frauds.3 5 In addition, he continues, the financing statement was
ample evidence of the parties' intent to create a security interest. The argument
concludes with the observation that the American Card court would have held the
interest enforceable if the debtor had signed "two pieces of paper instead of one"
and the comment that the court "gives [the Code] an effect reminiscent of the worst
formal requirements holding under the nineteenth century chattel mortgage acts."a 6
Professors Willier and Hart assert that American Card is wrong if it holds as a mat-
ter of law that a financing statement cannot satisfy the requirement for a signed
security agreement.37
Other authorities, including the courts, have been more favorable to the Ameri-
can Card reasoning. For example, one bankruptcy court, holding that a financing
statement and a promissory note did not make enforceable a claimed security agree-
ment, followed American Card, noting that "t]he very essence of a security agree-
ment is the provision or creation of a security interest." 38 However, this court did
suggest that, depending upon its terminology, a financing statement could satisfy the
requirement for a signed security agreement.39
Still other courts have adopted a less restrictive view, emphasizing the terms of
claimed security agreements. The decision upon which the Mann court primarily
relied, Mid-Eastern Electronics,40 characterized the § 9-203(1) (b) requirement as
in the nature of the statute of frauds. In finding unenforceable a security interest
claimed on the strength of promissory notes and a financing statement, that court
32 Id. at 62, 196 A.2d at 152.
33 See, e.g., Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Sales, Inc. v. Hurst, - Iowa- , 176 N.W.2d 166 (1970).
347Tis point was argued by Bank in the principal case. Brief for Security Nat'l Bank at 5,
In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970). See generally 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcS, § 501
at 699 (1950).
351 G. GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.4 at 347 (1965).
361d. at 348.
7 W. ILLIER AN F. HART, U.C.C REP.-DrEST 5 2-1679, A6 (1970).
3 8 In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1129,1134 (Bkrptcy. Cr., D. Me. 1969).
r In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. EP. SERv. 1129 (Bkrptcy. Ct. D.Me. 1969) (dicta). This court
put considerable emphasis on the intent element of the Code's definition of "signed." U.C.C. §
1-201(39). See 25 U. Pr. L REV. 619 (1964), in which the student author supports the
American Card rationale, characterizing the § 9-203(1)(b) requirement almost solely in the na-
ture of the statute of frauds.
40 Mid-Eastem Electronics, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Southern Maryland, 380 F.2d 355
C4th Cir. 1967). See note 13 supra.
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held that the signed writing must at least sketch the terms of the security agree-
ment.41  The Mid-Eastern rationale has been followed widely.42 However, Pro-
fessors Wilier and Hart suggest that the Mid-Eastern court held as a matter of law
that a financing statement cannot satisfy the requirement for a signed security agree-
ment and argue that, once the explicit requisites for a financing statement 3 have
been met, the existence of a security agreement is a question of fact.44 It is sub-
mitted that their view is in accord with the language and intent of Article 9.
The most striking facet of the American Card and Mid-Eastern approaches is
that both focus primarily on and state requirements for the content of the writing
proffered as a § 9-203(1) (b) signed security agreement. Clearly, the words con-
tained in the writing are material, but they are not central. Rather, the Code's sep-
arate requirement for a signed security agreement is based not on content but on
function. Faced with a financing statement proffered as a signed security agreement
a court's primary concern should be whether the writing functioned as a security agree-
ment. To this end, the words contained in the given writing are material, not be-
cause they satisfy a non-existent requirement for a "granting dause" or a "sketch of
terms," but because they are part of a finding that the writing does or does not rep-
resent the parties' creation of or provision for a security interest. Support for
this approach demands an examination of the function served by the signed writing
within the general scheme of Article 9.
The drafters obviously intended the requirement for a signed security agreement
to function in part as a statute of frauds.45 This use of and reason for the § 9-203
(1) (b) requirement deserves discussion if only for the attention given it by the
courts and commentators. The requirement is in accord with, pre-Code law dictates
that interests in personal property be evidenced by signed documents. "Security
agreement" is defined as "an agreement which creates or provides for a security in-
terest." 46  "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with pres-
ent intention to authenticate a writing."47 One function of the signed writing, then,
is that of demonstrating the debtor's intent to create or provide for a security inter-
est.48 Such a demonstration by writing is unnecessary where the creditor is in pos-
session of the collateral, 49 because the debtor's intent is more obvious.
Given a writing describing collateral over the debtor's signature, the question is
not what other language the proffered document must contain but rather whether
the debtor intended by signing to create or provide for a security interest.5 0 To this
end, the content of the document is probative but not determinative. With respect:
to the statute of frauds, the emphasis is on the existence of the writing, not on its
content. In the drafters' words:
41M id-Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Southern Maryland, 380 F.2d 355,
356 (4th Cir, 1967).
42 See, e.g., In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970); In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. 1BI.P.
SERv. 1129 (Bkrptcy. Ct., D.Me. 1969); M. Rutkin Elec. Supply Co. v. Burdette Elec., Inc., 98
N.J. Super. 378, 237 A.2d 500 (1967).
43 U.C§C § 9-402
4 .W.ILLrR AND F. HART, U.C.C. REP.-DmEST 5 2-1683, All (1970).
45U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 5.
46U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (h) (emphasis supplied).
47U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
4 8 Professor Gilmore's commentary on American Card supports this analysis. See the discus.
sion accompanying notes 35 and 36 supra.
4 9 Compare U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) with § 9-203(1)(b); see U.C.C. §9-203 Comment 3.
50 For a judicial examination of the meaning of the word "signed" which nonetheless -lield
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[TJhe requirement... that the debtor sign a security agreement is not in-
tended to reject, and does not reject, the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill
of sale although absolute in form may be shown to have been in fact given
as security.51
The question is whether in fact a security agreement has been created or pro-
vided for. Where the document proffered as a signed security agreement contains
only the minimal information required, whether or not that document functioned as
a security agreement can be determined only by examination of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding its signing, by the part it played in the parties' transaction(s).
In this light, the usefulness of a rigidly defined statute of frauds is doubtful.
Certainly it results in the reduction to writing of certain agreements. It may help
to call the attention of the debtor to the importance and legal significance of his
agreement by requiring him to perform the act of signing. On the other hand, the
inclusion of the statute of frauds in Article 9 can be argued to be more the result
of history than of a realistic appraisal of commercial reality. The debtor's signature
is no legal guarantee of his intent to create an agreement,52 and the statute of frauds
may be invoked to deny justice as easily as to serve it.5 Moreover, the wide diver-
sity of commercial transactions which give rise to security interests demands flexibil-
ity in determining whether a document functioned as a security agreement. Such
flexibility may be frustrated by anything more than minimal technical requisites for
the writing. The court which holds as a matter of law that a signed security agree-
ment must contain a granting clause sets precedent of no more utility than that set
by the court which holds that any writing satisfying the technical requisites of §
9-203(1) (b) is an enforceable security agreement. Both conclusions, if stated as
conclusions of law, frustrate the flexibility of the words "security agreement."
But discussion of the requirement for a signed writing from the point of view
of the statute of frauds alone does not reach the essence of the objectives and prac-
tical use of that requirement. In a classical sense, the statute of frauds is applied
negatively to a claimed agreement as between immediate parties, whereas the essence
of Article 9 is priority of interests, implying the existence of a third party, a second
creditor or a trustee in bankruptcy. It is not coincidence that all the decisions con-
struing § 9-203 cited herein arose out of bankruptcy or receivership actions. The
whole of Article 9 is concerned with the creation, attachment, perfection and en-
forceability of security interests, interests which have validity to a creditor primarily
to the extent that they represent rights as against other creditors. The sole creditor
can obtain a judgment and levy on his debtor's assets; he has little need of priority.
This difference in emphasis is reflected in a comparison of § 9-203 with the Article
2 statute of frauds, 54 which, while containing the same technical requisites for a
writing,55 is directed to enforceability as between the immediate parties to an agree-
ment, not to one of the parties as against a third party. Moreover, application of
the statute of frauds is essentially negative; it is used to preclude enforceability of
claimed interests. To say that a proffered document fails to satisfy the statute of
frauds is not to say what objectives are served by a writing which goes beyond the
that the existence of a signed security agreement depends upon its terminology, see In re
Rand, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1129 (Bkruptcy. Ct., D.Me. 1969).
51 U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 4.
52 Reflected by the Code's emphasis on the bargain of the parties in fact. U.C.C. § 1-201(3),
§ 9-204(1).
IS 2 A. CoBIeN, CoNTRACTs, § 275, at 13-14 (1950).
54 U.C.C. § 2-201.
55U.C.C. § 2-201 Comment 1.
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statute's minimum requisites. One of these objectives is that of evidencing the
terms of the agreement.
The Article 9 creditor is concerned with enforceability of a security agreement
which "is effective according to its terms, between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors."5 6 A real commercial utility of the signed writ-
ing lies in its evidentiary function. "The requirement of a written record minimizes
the possibility of future disputes as to the terms of a security agreement and as to
what property stands as collateral for the obligation secured." 57 To the extent that
the terms of a security agreement are reduced to writing, that agreement is more
likely to be clarified in both fact and legal consequence. If the terms of a security
agreement are written, dispute and litigation are reduced. If litigation does ensue,
a more complete written agreement will minimize the creditor's expenses of litigat-
ing. Moreover, a written agreement containing more than the minimal requisites
of § 9-203(1) (b) will reduce the necessary effort of the courts, no mean objective
in days of overloaded dockets. That the drafters intended the signed security agree-
ment to serve these evidentiary functions may be sufficient grounds for courts to
demand that a document reflect the security agreement and not just satisfy the tech-
nical requirement for a signed writing.
Because the Article 9 security agreement has the major portion of its impact in
the claims of creditor as against creditor, another argument can be made for includ-
ing the terms of the agreement in the signed writing. The debtor in bankruptcy,
for example, often may not have a vital interest in which of his creditors enforces
its claim on his property; the collateral is lost to him no matter which creditor pre-
vails. This being so, the debtor may have little interest in arguing that a security
agreement never existed in fact, attacking the sufficiency of the description of col-
lateral, and so forth. Certainly the creditor with the more complete writing is the
closer to enforceability of the interest claimed, all other Article 9 factors being
equal.58
The foregoing argument should not be extended too far. The secured creditor
who wants to insure enforceability of his interest is free to demand that any and
all terms of the agreement be included in the signed writing. Indeed, the drafters
assumed that the secured party would not be content with a writing which barely
satisfies the formal requisites of § 9-203(1) (b)., °  Surely the creditor should be in
the best position to know what is required for creation, perfection and enforceability
of a security interest. Moreover, while it is true that minimal requisites for enforce-
ability may permit the hypothetical unscrupulous creditor to enforce or expand a spu-
rious security interest, 60 it is just as true that extensive and rigid formal requisites
may prevent the scrupulous creditor from enforcing an honest one. Fear of the
open-ended security agreement should not overshadow the facts of an honest attempt
to create or reserve a security interest. To repeat, the trier of fact should determine
the adequacy of the signed document on the basis of its function in light of all the
facts and circumstances, of which only one is the writing making up its content.
There are, however, other practical reasons for requiring the signed security
agreement to contain more than the minimum requisites of § 9-203(1) (b), argu-
15U.C.C. § 9-201.
57U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 3.
58U.C.C. § 9-203 Comment 1.
59 This is not to suggest that there are degrees of enforceability; rather, it is an all or noth-
ing situation. A security interest is either enforceable or it is not. See note 26 supra.
6 0 See In re Rand, 6U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1129 (Bkrptcy, Ct. D.Me. 1969).
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ments in addition to those already discussed. 61 Some measure of "technicality in
form" may be desirable for two reasons. First, the potential secured creditor wants
a security interest which can be enforced almost automatically, without the courts;
he does not care to anticipate litigation costs every time a debtor defaults on the
underlying obligation or files a petition in bankruptcy. Also in the interest of econ-
omy, the creditor wants forms and procedures which he can use with minimum ad-
vice from counsel. Both the debtor and the potential second creditor have more
than a passing curiosity in the enforceability of the first creditor's security interest.
These considerations of expense and certainty are part and parcel of the commercial
reality which concerned the drafters62 and bear directly on the cost of credit.
Second, the judicial invocation of § 9-203(1) (b), like the historical statute of
frauds, may serve as a convenient way of saying that the believability of an agree-
ment is questionable. In this light, the "technicality" of § 9-203(1) (b) can be
employed by a court when convenient to serve justice or may be otherwise circum-
vented or ignored.63 Thus, when a court says that a creditor's claimed security in-
terest is unenforceable because he has used a form inappropriate to his purpose, 4
it may express the view that the usefulness of the form in commercial practice is
questionable or that the creditor has failed to demonstrate a security agreement.
The numerous pre-Code ways of creating interests in personal property evolved
over time from the needs of diverse commercial situations. In their effort to unify
prior law and bring it to a more workable form within the context of modern com-
mercial practice, the Code's drafters broadly defined "security interest"015 to include
the interests created by these diverse situations. It follows that the concept of agree-
ments which create or provide for security interests6 must be similarly broad if Ar-
ticle 9 is to apply over the wide scope of security interests created by contract.07 Ac-
cordingly, the phrase "security agreement" encompasses such diverse labels as
"chattel mortgage," "conditional sale," "trust receipt" and "factor's lien."0 s  On
the other hand, the broadness of the phrase "security agreement" should not obscure
the fact that, while the law of security interests is unified in Article 9, the commercial
ituations in which those interests are created are no less diverse.6 Rigid judicially
defined requisites for the content of a signed agreement may seriously narrow the
broadness of the phrase, to the exclusion of some of those commercial situations.
The existence and validity of any security agreement must be determined with
reference to the commercial situation within which it arose, from examination of its
use by the parties in their particular transaction. Similarly, the enforceability of a
security agreement must depend in part upon the commercial context of its creation.
The title and content of the written agreement should not overshadow the facts of
the interest for which it provides. Thus, a lease intended by the parties to create
61 See discussion accompanying notes 48 to 58 supra.
62 See, e.g., U.C.C. §9-101 Comment.
6a See generally 2 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrs, § 275 (1950).
64 In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 36 (W.D. va. 1970) 4ting Safe Deposit Bank and Trust Co.
v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 1968).
65U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
6U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h).
67 U.C.C. § 9-102(2); § 9-101 Comment.
68U.C.C. § 9-105 Comment 1.
69 As the Article recognizes in its extensive differentiation of collateral, U.C.C. § 9-109, and
complicated rules of priority, U.CC. § 9-312. While they simplied the overlying concept of




a security interest, even though it contained no "granting clause," has been read to-
gether with a filed financing statement to satisfy the § 9-203(1) (b) requirement
for a signed security agreement. 70  Obviously, where property is "leased" with an
option to purchase, the lessor/seller reserves a security interest; the lessee does not
"grant" him one. Accordingly, a "granting clause" would not reflect the parties'
agreement and should not be required by a court for enforceability. Before denying
the enforceability of a claimed security interest, the trier of fact might first deter-
mine whether that interest was granted or reserved.
Given a written lease containing a description of the collateral over the debtor's
signature, if the circumstances of the commercial transaction show that a security
interest was reserved, the lease should be enforceable as a security agreement. There
is indeed no other way in which the creditor's interest will be protected. By the
same token, written assignment of diary proceeds found to have functioned as a se-
curity agreement was enforced as such, even though these proceeds were excluded
from the signed document tided "security agreement." 71  To satisfy § 9-203(1)(b)
"the security agreement must be in writing but not in any particular form,"72 and
a creditor's letter accepted in writing by the debtor may function as an enforceable
security agreement with respect to an account receivable.73 In Redisco, Inc., v.
United Thrift Stores, Inc.,74 the court found an enforceable security agreement in
the facts of the parties transactions, trust receipts, bills of sale and a filed financing
statement. That court commented:
The Uniform Commercial Code was designed to bring the body of com-
mercial law into the contemporary world of business .... It would hard-
ly be consistent with that design ... to reestablish in new form limitations
which reflect a passion for legal technicality over commercial reality.75
Applying this approach to the use of a financing statement to satisfy the require-
ments of § 9-203(1) (b), there is no reason in law why the duly filed statement
cannot serve as a signed security agreement. This is not to say that any financing
statement satisfying the formal requisites should be enforceable as a signed security
agreement, nor is such a conclusion implicit in the Code. The prime question is
whether, within the circumstances of a particular transaction, the statement func-
tioned as a security agreement in fact, as has already been submitted.76 In normal
course, the function of the financing statement is quite different. Unlike the secu-
ity agreement, "[as financing statement does not create [or provide fori the security
7 0 In re Walter v. Willis, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ga. 1966). Accord, In re Atlanta
Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Bankers Commer-
cial Corp., 244 Ark. 984, 429 S.W.2d 60 (1968). These cases suggest that some courts implicitly
differentiate for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) those situations in which an interest is re-
served from those in which one is granted. This is desirable insofar as it represents an examina-
tion of the facts of a particular transaction. However, if conclusions are stated as law, resulting
precedent may develop cases analogous to those based on whether a transaction was a chattel
mortgage or a conditional sale, a type of case grounded in technicalities the drafters sought to
avoid.
71 In re Schreiber, 7 U.C.C. REP. SRV. 365 (Bkrptcy. Ct, W.D. Wis. 1969).
72 Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Capital Constr. Co., 112 Ga. App. 189, 190 144 S.B.2d 465,
466 (1965).
73 Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Capital Constr. Co., 112 Ga. App. 189, 144 S.E.2d 465
(1965).
74 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966).
75 Id. at 14.
76 See discussion accompanying notes 50 to 60 supra.
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interest, but merely gives notice to creditors that a security interest is claimed." 77
It may be filed before the interest attaches,7 8 may describe only the types of collat-
eral in which the interest is claimed, 79 and under some circumstances need not be
signed by the debtor.80
Separate sections of Article 9 set forth the requirements for a signed security
agreement and a financing statement because each document was intended to serve
a different function, not because the drafters sought to require two pieces of paper
instead of one. There is no reason why the two functions cannot be combined in
the same document once the formal requisites of each are satisfied, as indeed a copy
of the former can be filed as the latter.81 The financing statement in Mann satisfied
the formal requisites of § 9-203 (1) (b); the repeated appearances of the word "col-
lateral" might suggest that a security agreement was being provided for; the trier of
fact, after examining the facts and circumstances of the parties' transactions, found
that an agreement did exist. Nothing in the Code explicitly demanded that this
finding be reversed. Perhaps unfortunately, the reversing court stated its conclusion
as a matter of law.
The formal requisites of the required signed security agreement are minimal,
consistent with the broadness of the concept of that agreement itself. The practical
arguments for greater formality in the written agreement are not decisive. On the
one hand, more extensive formal requirements may result in greater certainty,
predictability and commercial and judicial economy. On the other, these same for-
malities, or technicalities, may needlessly complicate the law of secured transactions,
result in "paper battles" having little relation to commercial practice, and reduce the
ability of Article 9 to encompass new security devices as these arise in business trans-
actions. However these policy issues are resolved, the court which states as a mat-
ter of law, outside the context of a particular transaction, that a financing statement or
any other document because of its content cannot serve as a signed security agree-
ment, sets precedent which reduces its own flexibility. Of course, an out of context
statement of the reverse is just as limiting on the courts ability to interpret the re-
quirement with the flexibility it demands. Much to be preferred is the opinion stat-
ing that, in light of the facts of the case, a proffered document did or did not func-
tion as a signed security agreement.
In any event, as many courts appear to read § 9-203, the Code technician who
contents himself with a writing satisfying only the formal requisites of that section
does so to his client's peril.
L. M. McCorkle
7 7 In re Schreiber, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 365, 366 (Bkrptcy. Ct, W.D. Wis. 1969); see
U.C.C. § 9-402 Comment 2.
78U.C.C. § 9-402(1). A fact given more judicial attention in the present problem than its
worth. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., v. Hurst, - Iowa - , 176
N.W.2d 166 (1970), a case which states its conclusion in an unfortunate way, whatever the valid-




a In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970). See discussion accompanying notes 2 to
3 supra.
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